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RECENT DECISION
Constitutional Law-Due Process- PROSECUTION'S USE OF ACCUSED'S
SILENCE FOR IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES VIOLATES FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976).
Fundamental to our adversary system of justice is the right to impeach
the testimony of an opposition witness.' This right extends to a criminal
defendant who chooses to take the stand,2 for his veracity and credibility
are in issue.3 Admission of prior silence as a means of impeaching the
testimony of a witness was favored by a broad rule of evidence at common
law.4 However, the existence of an inconsistency between the silence and
later testimony was a necessary condition for the admission of the defen-
dant's prior silence.5 While the courts have not defined the degree of incon-
sistency required to allow a prior statement to be used for impeachment
purposes,6 the establishment of an inconsistency is a question of fact, de-
pendent "on the individual circumstances, and in all of them the underly-
ing test is, would it have been natural for the person to make the assertion
in question?" 7 Frequently, application of this common law rule resulted in
1. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 874 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].
2. Id. 43 890-91. A defendant is subject to cross examination and to some extent waives
his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination when he takes the witness stand. The
question is how extensive is such waiver. McCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvIDENCE §
132 (E. Cleary ed. 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMIcK]. It was once thought to be
well-settled that a prosecutor could not cross-examine the accused regarding his silence at
the time of arrest or his request for the assistance of counsel. Fagundes v. United States, 340
F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965); People v. Williams, 26 Mich. App. 218, 182 N.W.2d 347 (1970). Some
courts hold that when a defendant presents a detailed exculpatory explanation or alibi at
trial, it is a proper test of the story's credibility to question whether the story had ever been
previously offered. United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
869, reh. denied, 404 U.S. 987 (1971) (explanation); United States v. White, 377 F.2d 908 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967) (alibi).
3. WIoGoRE §§ 889-90. See also 81 Am. JuR. 2d Witnesses § 524 (1976).
4. WIGMORE § 1042(2), at 1057 & n.2. However, it has been held violative of the fifth
amendment to question a defendant regarding his silence at an earlier trial, at the trial of a
co-defendant, in a preliminary hearing or before a grand jury. Stewart v. United States, 366
U.S. 1 (1961) (earlier trial); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (grand jury);
People v. Jordan, 7 Mich. App. 28, 151 N.W.2d 242 (1967) (preliminary hearing); Dean v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 666, 166 S.E.2d 228 (1969) (trial of a co-defendant).
5. WIGMORE § 1040(1).
6. Id. § 1040 (setting forth varying standards defining the degree of inconsistency required
at common law to permit impeachment of a witness by prior statement).
7. Id. § 1042(3). Often rather than explaining why prior silence was or was not inconsistent
with defendant's trial testimony, courts on both sides of the issue simply have asserted a
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the admission of the defendant's prior silence.'
There have developed two modes of analysis which the courts use to
determine the permissibility of impeachment by evidence of prior silence.
"Evidentiary" analysis,9 relied upon by the Supreme Court in Raffel v.
United States1 and in Grunewald v. United States," determines whether
the prior silence has sufficient probative value to outweigh the prejudicial
harm to be done to the defendant. The "penalty" theory, 2 which was
applied by the Court in Griffin v. California3 based upon a concurring
opinion in Grunewald,4 attempts to determine whether a penalty has been
imposed upon a defendant who has exercised a constitutional right. 5 Hale
position, virtually a priori, based upon the facts of a particular case. See, e.g., United States
ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234, 238 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, J., concurring), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 938 (1973) ("inconsistent with his testimony at trial that the shooting was acciden-
tal"); Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1068 n.3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973); United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950, 954 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971) ("a prior inconsistent act").
8. MCCORMICK § 161, at 353.
9. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S.
494 (1926).
10. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
11. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
12. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See also Grunewald v. United States,
353 U.S. 391, 425 (1957) (Black, J., concurring). Generally, the impeachment right has been
recognized in several contexts when countervailing constitutional issues were raised, in spite
of the potential prejudice to a defendant's fair trial. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be shown to impeach credibility);
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560-62 (1967) (prior valid convictions); cf. Loper v. Beto, 405
U.S. 473 (1972); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (evidence obtained in violation
of the fourth amendment may be used to impeach). See also Comment, Impeaching a Defen-
dant's Trial Testimony by Proof of Post-Arrest Silence, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 940 (1975).
These cases in the constitutional area are indicative that when the Court has the opportun-
ity to weigh the impeachment of defendant's testimony (the judicial system's interest in
getting at the truth) against the penalty theory (penalizing a defendant for exerting a consti-
tutional privilege and right), often the impeachment of the defendant will be permitted. See
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
13. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
14. 353 U.S. at 425 (Black, J., concurring).
15. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966):
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for
exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interroga-
tion. The prosecutor may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he [the defendant]
stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.
This statement is dictum, however, since none of the cases involved a confession by silence
(tacit confession). Since Miranda, some cases have interpreted this to mean that silence or a
claim of the privilege made in response to a police accusation during custodial interrogation
is inadmissible. United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969); Fowle v. United
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v. United States,'6 decided by the Court in 1975 under its supervisory
powers," applied evidentiary analysis with two concurring opinions being
based upon the penalty theory.'" Hale, however, left unanswered the con-
stitutional objections to impeachment by evidence of post-arrest silence.
In the recent case of Doyle v. Ohio,'9 the Supreme Court was faced with
the issue of "whether a state prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendant's
exculpatory testimony, told for the first time at trial, by cross-examining
the defendant about his failure to have told the story after receiving
Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest.""0
Doyle and another defendant, Wood, were convicted of selling marijuana
to a narcotics bureau informant in separate trials stemming from the same
incident. The state's witness offered testimony sketching a routine mari-
juana transaction involving the informant's purchase of ten pounds of
marijuana from the defendants." After the transaction, the defendants
were stopped within minutes and arrested. Upon arrest they were given the
Miranda warnings by the arresting agent. In their respective trials, each
defendant took the stand and admitted practically everything about the
state's case except who was selling the marijuana to whom. At trial each
defendant offered exculpatory testimony which indicated they were not the
sellers, but rather the buyers of the marijuana.2
States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969); State v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968); State v. Rice,
37 Wisc. 2d 392, 155 N.W.2d 116 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 878 (1968).
Even prior to Miranda, some authorities supported the view that an accused being under
arrest was sufficient to render inadmissible the fact of his failure to deny accusatory state-
ments made in his hearing and presence. This view was based upon the common knowledge
of men in general that silence while under arrest is most conducive to the welfare of an
accused, whether he is guilty or innocent. Ivey v. United States, 344 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1965);
Cooper v. State, 231 Md. 248, 189 A.2d 620 (1963); Ellis v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 522, 128 P.
1095 (1913).
16. 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
17. Id. at 173. The supervisory power was first clearly articulated in what is still the leading
case of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943), in which the supervisory power
was characterized as the Court's exercise of "its traditional power over the admission of
evidence to achieve what it considers a desirable practice in federal law enforcement and one
which was intended by Congress." (Emphasis added). See also Comment, Impeachment of a
Criminal Defendant by Evidence of Post-Arrest Silence: A Conflict Partially Resolved, 61
IOWA L. Rv. 641, 654 n.134 (1975).
18. 422 U.S. at 182 (Douglas and White, JJ., concurring).
19. 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976).
20. Id. at 2241.
21. Id. at 2242. The narcotics informant offered to assist the local narcotics investigation
unit in setting up drug "pushers" in return for support in his efforts to receive lenient
treatment in his latest legal problems.
22. Id. There was some confusion about whether there was an actual eyewitness to the
transaction (i.e., the actual transfer of the marijuana from the defendant to the informant).
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In essence, the defendants testified to being framed by the informant.
Since their testimony was not entirely implausible and there was little
direct evidence to contradict it,23 the prosecutor engaged in an effort to
impeach the defendants' testimony on cross-examination by asking them
why they had not told their "frame-up" story to the arresting agent. 2
Defense counsel's objections were overruled and the defendants were con-
victed. The decision was affirmed on appeal, and the Ohio Supreme Court
denied further review.5
The United States Supreme Court concluded that the use of the defen-
dants' silence at the time of arrest and after receiving the Miranda warn-
ings, for impeachment purposes, violated the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause.26 Doyle was the first Supreme Court case to address the
issue of using silence to impeach on constitutional grounds.,
Doyle is significant in that it provides precedent for federal and state
courts with respect to the constitutional issue raised by the prosecution's
use of the defendants' post-arrest silence to impeach exculpatory trial
testimony.2 Prior to this decision there had been a considerable split in
The defendants testified that when they told the informant of their change of mind (i.e., to
purchase one or two pounds of marijuana instead of the agreed upon ten) that he became
angry and threw the money into their car. The defendants maintained that they were stopped
while they were pursuing the informant to find out what the $1320 was all about.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2243.
25. Id. notes 4-5 (citing lower court transcripts).
26. Id. at 2245. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Supreme Court held that the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is binding upon the states through the
fourteenth amendment and that the same fifth amendment standards apply in state as in
federal proceedings. See also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
The privilege against self-incrimination was aimed at a far-reaching evil, preventing a
recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, if not in their stark brutality at least in
their effect. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
27. The Hale decision, since it was decided upon supervisory powers, did not reach the
constitutional issue involved. Therefore, until Doyle, there remained a split between the
states deciding the issue. See note 29 infra and accompanying text.
28. In recent years, the Supreme Court has rejected other opportunities to consider the
issue. See United States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 938 (1973); Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973); United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971);
State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969).
Hale v. United States, 422 U.S. 171 (1975), failed to decide the issue along constitutional
lines. In Hale, the Court applied an evidentiary analysis approach to the issue of impeach-
ment by evidence of post-arrest silence. But see id. at 182 (Douglas and White, JJ., concur-
ring). Justice Douglas based his concurrence upon the penalty theory and relied upon the
defendant's right to remain silent. Justice White, also using the penalty theory, relied upon
due process.
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authority both within the federal circuits and state courts.2 The Supreme
Court's decision in Hale did not help to resolve these splits in authority.
Since Hale was decided under supervisory powers, 0 rather than on consti-
tutional grounds, proponents of both the prosecution and the defense have
used the decision as justification for bolstering their respective argu-
29. Prior to Hale, a majority of the federal circuits considering the issue held that impeach-
ment by evidence of post-arrest silence was impermissible on constitutional grounds. The
prevailing rationale was that such impeachment was an impermissible penalty on the exercise
of a constitutional right. See Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 878 (1973); United States v. Semensohn, 421 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1970); United States
v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969); Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969);
Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965).
A minority of the federal circuits relied upon Harris v. United States, 401 U.S. 222 (1971),
which permitted the prosecution to question a defendant about the inconsistency of his trial
testimony with statements made earlier, even though the prior statements were taken without
the giving of Miranda warnings. The Court held that on cross-examination, a statement
obtained by police in admitted violation of Miranda could be used for impeachment purposes.
The Court seemed to have fashioned an exception to the Miranda rule in holding that al-
though unconstitutionally obtained evidence is inadmissible against the accused as part of
the prosecution's case-in-chief, it is admissible for impeachment purposes. On the basis of
Harris, the constitutional arguments were rejected, thus permitting a defendant to be im-
peached by cross-examination as to his earlier silence. See Agnellino v. New Jersey, 493 F.2d
714 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Quintana-Gomez, 488 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Burt v. New Jersey, 475 F.2d 234 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 938 (1973);
United States v. Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
The state courts deciding the issue mirrored the federal circuit courts' split in authority
with the majority of state courts deciding against use of evidence for impeachment purposes
on constitutional grounds. See State v. Greer, 17 Ariz. App. 162, 496 P.2d 152 (1972); Sutton
v. State, 25 Md. App. 309, 334 A.2d 126 (1975); People v. Bobo, 390 Mich. 355, 212 N.W.2d
190 (1973); Reid v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 790, 195 S.E.2d 866 (1973). See also Comment,
Impeachment of a Criminal Defendant by Evidence of Post-Arrest Silence: A Conflict Par-
tially Resolved, 61 IowA L. REv. 640, 642 n.12 (1975).
A significant minority of the states, however, rejected the constitutional arguments and
allowed such impeachment. See State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279 (1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969); People v. Rothschild, 35 N.Y.2d 355, 320 N.E.2d 639, 361
N.Y.S.2d 901 (1974); State v. Mink, 23 N.C. App. 203, 208 S.E.2d 522 (1974).
A number of state courts rejected or failed to consider the majority approach adopted in
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). In Grunewald, the Court held by expressing
the evidentiary analysis test that the defendant's trial testimony could not be impeached by
the prosecution through reference to the defendant's silence before the grand jury. Grunewald
placed a heavy burden on the prosecution to demonstrate inconsistency between silence and
later testimony. These state courts adopted evidentiary standards which allowed more fre-
quent use of silence for impeachment purposes. See People v. Rothschild, 35 N.Y.2d 355, 320
N.E.2d 639, 361 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1974). See also Comment, Impeachment of a Criminal Defen-
dant by Evidence of Post-Arrest Silence: A Conflict Partially Resolved, 61 IOWA L. REv. 640,
655 n.143 (1975).
30. See note 17 supra.
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ments.31 The Doyle decision has resolved the continuing conflict over this
issue.
Prior to Doyle most of the decisions which held impeachment by evi-
dence of silence unconstitutional based their decisions on the fifth amend-
ment's 31 right to remain silent (privilege against self-incrimination).3
While there were some lower court decisions that suggested such impeach-
ment might violate due process, 34 Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion
31. One federal circuit, the fifth, had started to waver prior to Hale, stating in dicta that
use for impeachment purposes of prior silence could be limited to "the rare and exceptional
case," United States v. Harp, 513 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir. 1975), or to "extreme cases," United
States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1975).
Subsequent to Hale, the Supreme Court held that in prison disciplinary hearings silence
in the face of accusation could be a relevant factor for consideration not barred from evidence
by the due process clause. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551 (1976).
Federal circuit decisions holding that evidence of post-arrest silence is inadmissible for
impeachment since Hale include: United States v. Impson, 531 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1976);
Minor v. Black, 527 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975). Contra, United States v. Rose, 525 F.2d 1026 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1432 (1976).
State court cases holding that evidence of post-arrest silence is inadmissible for impeach-
ment since Hale include: Bennett v. State, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1975); Lowe v. State, 136 Ga.
App. 631, 222 S.E.2d 50 (1975); People v. Wright, 32 Ill. App. 3d 736, 336 N.E.2d 18 (1975);
Vipperman v. State, 547 P.2d 682 (Nev. 1976); State v. Lara, 88 N.M. 233, 539 P.2d 623
(1975); Commonwealth v. Boyer, 237 Pa. Super. 341, 352 A.2d 431, 438 (1975) (Hoffman, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (dissenting as to alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel as a result
of his failure to object to prosecution's reference to accused's silence during the cross-
examination); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. 1976); Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173
(Wyo. 1976). But see Farmer v. State, 326 So. 2d 32 (Fla. App. 1976); Shy v. State, 234 Ga.
816, 218 S.E.2d 599, 606 (1975) ("The Supreme Court of the United States has not given
definitive guidance on the precise question .. "); Niemeyer v. Commonwealth, 533 S.W.2d
218 (Ky. 1976); Commonwealth v. Morgan, 339 N.E.2d 723 (Mass. 1975); State v. Jones, 532
S.W.2d 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Baca, 89 N.M. 204, 549 P.2d 282 (1976).
32. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
33. See Hale v. United States, 422 U.S. 171, 182 (1975) (Douglas, J., concurring); Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 425 (1957)
(Black, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court has consistently offered considerable protection for fifth amendment
rights. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). But cf. California v.
Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 459 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the recent line of cases
represents a weakening of fifth amendment rights).
Lower courts have also based their decisions on fifth amendment grounds: Johnson v.
Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); Fowle v. United States,
410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Brinson, 411 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1969); State v.
Greer, 17 Ariz. App. 162, 496 P.2d 152 (1972); Sutton v. State, 25 Md. App. 309, 334 A.2d
126 (1975).
34. See Hale v. United States, 422 U.S. 171, 182 (1975) (White, J., concurring). Justice
White held that the defendant's silence in reliance on Miranda warnings may not be used
for impeachment purposes because taking advantage of the defendant's reliance violates due
process. See also United States v. Anderson, 498 F.2d 1038, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State v.
[Vol. 11:667
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in Hale5 was most instrumental in aiding the Court to reach its ultimate
decision in Doyle36 based upon due process3 7 (elementary fairness)-" analy-
sis.
The Doyle decision relied upon the penalty theory, holding it impermis-
sible to penalize a defendant for the invocation of his fifth amendment
privilege.39 While acknowledging that "the Miranda warnings carry no ex-
press assurance that silence will carry no penalty. . . ," Mr. Justice Pow-
ell, writing for the majority, stated that "such assurance is implicit to any
person who receives the warnings."4 This approach is in contrast to Hale
which adopted a strict evidentiary analysis approach reminiscent of the
Grunewald majority."
The Court noted that "every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous
because of what the state is required to advise the person arrested. 4 2 There
is an implication that an anomaly arises when this ambiguous silence is
later used to impeach the person's testimony. 3 The anomaly arises in
reminding an accused that he has a constitutional privilege-the right to
remain silent"-but using the exercise of that privilege against him later.
Greer, 17 Ariz. App. 162, 163-64, 496 P.2d 152, 153-54 (1972); State v. Griffin, 120 N.J. Super.
Ct. 3, 17, 293 A.2d 217, 219 (1972).
35. 422 U.S. at 182-83 (White, J., concurring).
36. 96 S. Ct. at 2245.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
The Doyle Court held:
In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due
process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation
subsequently offered at trial.
96 S. Ct. at 2245.
38. The Court's conclusion was based upon the necessity for elementary fairness as indi-
cated in previous opinions of the Court. See Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 197
(1943). In Johnson, it was held that it would be unfair to a defendant, who had been informed
of his right to remain silent at trial by the court and who had availed himself of that right,
to allow his silence to be used against him. Cf. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-40 (1959).
39. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
40. 96 S. Ct. at 2245.
41. 422 U.S. at 177-80.
42. 96 S. Ct. at 2244. In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that in Hale they had recog-
nized the inherently ambiguous nature of silence at arrest even apart from the Miranda
warnings. The Court also noted that because the basis of the Doyle decision was due process
it was not necessary to express an opinion on the probative value for impeachment purposes
of the defendant's silence. Id. at 2244 n.8. See also Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973) ("[S]ilence at the time of arrest is not an inconsistent
or contradictory statement. Silence at the time of arrest is simply the exercise of a
constitutional right. . . ."); McCoamicK § 270.
43. 96 S. Ct. at 2245, citing Hale, 422 U.S. at 182-83.
44. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The effect of this is especially biting since the accused has not been warned
that the exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent can be used
against him at some future time.'-
The Court points out that the error it perceives lies in the cross-
examination of the defendant's silence, "thereby implying an inconsis-
tency that the jury might construe as evidence of guilt."" It has been
consistently held that use of an accused's post-arrest silence as evidence
of guilt violates the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 7
The Court recognizes that the anomalous situation involving the defen-
dant's silence gives rise to an impermissible inference of guilt, as well as
an inference of incredibility. Thus the defendant is penalized for exercising
a constitutional privilege. Doyle provides that no longer should an ac-
cused's arrest place him in the position of having to choose whether to talk
or whether to remain silent, not knowing that the latter could be just as
harmful to his cause as the former. The decision is consistent with and
supportive of both an accused's rights to remain silent and to take the
stand in his own defense. It is a sound reaffirmance of an individual's right
to due process as guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
The clear direction of Griffin" and Miranda49 has been toward protecting
an accused's right to remain silent. To attain that end, they prohibit the
placing of any penalty on the right of the accused to remain silent. Where
the accused has exercised the constitutional privilege to remain silent, no
penalty should be imposed on the exercise of that right. 0 Doyle goes be-
45. See Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066, 1068 (10th Cir. 1973). See also 87 HARv. L.
REv. 882, 887 (1974).
46. 96 S. Ct. at 2245 n.10. As pointed out in Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 54 (9th
Cir. 1969), it may be psychologically impossible for the jury to restrict its consideration of
the examination and the comment to impeachment only.
47. See, Comment, Impeaching a Defendant's Trial Testimony By Proof of Post-Arrest
Silence, 123 U. PA. L. Ray. 940, 943 n.16 (1975).
48. 380 U.S. at 614. Griffin held that comment by a state prosecutor or court on the failure
of the defendant to testify constituted a constitutional violation. The Court stated that the
federal constitutional privilege was violated by a prosecutor's argument which urged and a
jury instruction which authorized the jury to draw an inference of guilt from the defendant's
failure to testify when the testimony could have reasonably been expected to deny or explain
matters proved by the prosecutor. This, the Court concluded, was a penalty for exercising
the privilege and a remnant of the "inquisitorial system of criminal justice" which the privi-
lege prohibits. See also Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 425-26 (Black, J., concurring):
The value of constitutional privileges is largely destroyed if persons can be penalized
for relying on them. It seems peculiarly incongruous and indefensible for courts which
exist and act only under the Constitution to draw inferences of lack of honesty from
invocation of a privilege deemed worthy of enshrinement in the Constitution.
49. 384 U.S. at 468 n.37. See also note 15 supra.
50. Cf. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971);
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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yond these cases and asserts that no penalty should be attached and no
inference, either of incredibility or guilt, should be drawn from a defen-
dant's post-arrest silence because of the fundamental unfairness inherent
in such a situation.51 Due process provides a sound grounding upon which
to base the decision since it is not subject to an inference of waiver as is
silence or self-incrimination.
The majority in Doyle seems to have given preference to the Miranda
analysis52 over Raffel;53 while the dissent relies upon Raffel instead of
Miranda. Raffel provides that once a defendant takes the stand he waives
his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The question is
whether the waiver is retroactive to the time of arrest or only applicable
to the defendant's statements while on the stand. The majority in Doyle
implies that the waiver applies solely to what the defendant says upon the
stand,5 while the dissent thinks the waiver is retroactive, and therefore
In Walder, it was held that a defendant who takes the stand and in his testimony goes
beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crime charged, making a "sweeping claim" concern-
ing collateral matters, may be impeached by evidence inadmissible under the fourth amend-
ment. In essence, the Court was saying that prior inconsistent facts, illegally obtained, were
admissible for determining the defendant's credibility but not his guilt.
See note 29 supra and accompanying text for discussion of Harris.
Oregon v. Hass provided the Court with another opportunity to pen an exception to the
general rule as had been done in Walder and Harris. In Hass, after receiving the Miranda
warnings and being told he would have to wait until he arrived at the police station to call
an attorney, the defendant provided inculpatory information. This information was admissi-
ble in evidence solely for impeachment purposes where the defendant had taken the stand
and testified contrary to the inculpatory information, knowing that the information had been
ruled inadmissible for the prosecution's case-in-chief. Whereas Harris provided police with
an incentive not to give the Miranda warnings, Hass provides an incentive to press the
accused for incriminating statements even after he has indicated that he wants to exercise
his right to counsel or to remain silent. These expansions of Walder seem inconsistent with
an accused's constitutional rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
51. 96 S. Ct. at 2245 n.10. The Court points out that after an arrested person has been given
the Miranda warnings, the unfairness occurs when the prosecutor, in the presence of the jury,
undertakes to impeach the accused on the basis of what may be the exercise of the rights
enumerated by Miranda.
52. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also notes 15 and 49 supra and accompanying text.
53. 271 U.S. at 496-97:
The immunity from giving testimony is one which the defendant may waive by offering
himself as a witness .... When he takes the stand in his own behalf, he does so as
any other witness, and within the limits of the appropriate rules he may be cross-
examined as to the facts in issue. . . . He may be examined for the purpose of im-
peaching his credibility .... His failure to deny or explain evidence of incriminating
circumstances of which he may have knowledge may be the basis of adverse inference,
and the jury may be so instructed .... His waiver is not partial; having once cast
aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at will, whenever cross-examination
may be inconvenient or embarrasing.
54. 96 S. Ct. at 2245.
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silence upon arrest can be used to impeach the defendant's trial testi-
mony.5
Mr. Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, argues that the defendants'
failure to mention at the time of arrest that they had been framed is
"tantamount to a prior inconsistent statement and admissible for purposes
of impeachment." 6 He further argues that the defendants' failure to state
that they based their silence upon the Miranda warnings is determinative
that they should be subject to impeachment because it negates the major-
ity's presumption that their silence was induced by reliance upon "decep-
tive advice."5
It must be remembered, however, that the defendants have a constitu-
tional right to remain silent irrespective of the Miranda warnings, and
their failure to state such a reliance upon Miranda should not negate that
privilege. Miranda mandates merely an advising or a reminder of one's
constitutional right. The majority stated that an accused by invoking a
constitutional right, not a Miranda warning, should not be penalized for
it. The defendants were not penalized for relying on the Miranda warnings;
they were penalized for exercising a constitutional privilege-the right to
remain silent-and such a penalty violates due process.
Through Doyle the Court has precluded the eventual necessity of adding
a fifth warning to Miranda-that anything the accused does not say (his
silence) can also be held against him. This warning, quite naturally, would
in turn make all statements involuntary and therefore inadmissible since
it would be nothing more than a threat. The undesirable effect of such a
warning would be in preventing the admission into evidence of confessions
and statements made after receiving the fifth warning because they would
have been coerced.
As a result of Doyle, courts no longer will be faced with deciding on a
case-by-case basis the evidentiary question of whether a defendant's post-
55. Id. at 2248.
56. Id. at 2246 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See the majority's discussion of silence as
inherently ambiguous.
57. Id. at 2246-47.
The dissent, while recognizing the limitation placed upon using the defendants' silence as
evidence of guilt, relies upon Raffel's allowance of the defendant's silence to be used for
impeachment purposes. The dissent further argues that Walder permits such impeachment.
Even though there is a valid constitutional objection to the admissibility of evidence as proof
of guilt, this does not bar the use of that evidence to impeach the defendant's trial testimony.
The dissent feels that unless the majority is willing to openly overrule Raffel the evidence of
the defendants' silence should be admissible because, by taking the stand at trial, the defen-
dants waived their objection to the use of their prior silence. However, the majority did not
overrule Raffel nor did it reach these issues raised by the dissent. See id. at 2244 n.6.
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arrest silence is sufficiently inconsistent with his trial testimony to be
relevant on the issue of his credibility. Neither will they have to decide
whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact, no matter
what its theoretical or practical probative value.
The Doyle decision settles this area of the law which has remained open
to varying interpretations since Miranda was decided; its permanence is
all but guaranteed."
Doyle guarantees that the accused is not deprived of the ability to make
an intelligent decision concerning his right to remain silent or later take
the stand in his own defense. The Court has eliminated the accused's
potential dilemma of exercising his right to remain silent and later jeop-
ardizing his position by taking the stand and having to answer for that
silence. It is violative of due process to use a defendant's post-arrest silence
for purposes of impeaching his trial testimony; any other holding would be
fundamentally unfair.
Calvin W. Colyer
58. The Court's six-to-three decision in the area of individual rights is all the stronger given
the fact of the conservative composition of the present Court, especially when considering its
concern for "law and order."
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